Optimizely's CDN Served a Card Skimmer to 178 Organisations on Nov. 16, and the Notice Names No Flaw
Security / analysis
Optimizely's CDN Served a Card Skimmer to 178 Organisations on Nov. 16, and the Notice Names No Flaw
Report URI found 188 infected snippets among 1,611; Optimizely says a vulnerability, while Report URI said it could not tell how the attacker got write access.
Anyone who loaded a page on 16 November 2026 that pulled its A/B-testing snippet from cdn.optimizely.com could have received a crypto-address swapper, a card skimmer and, on older iPhones, an exploit kit (no visitor action needed beyond loading the page). Report URI counted 188 infected snippets belonging to 178 organisations, out of 1,611 it fetched. The cleanup finished that evening, but Optimizely's only public statement says nothing about how the attacker got in.
What Report URI found on 16 November
Scott Helme published the Report URI write-up on 16 November and updated it on 17 November at 09:17 UTC. The attacker wrote code into the optional Project JavaScript field that Optimizely Web customers use, so the malicious loader was served from Optimizely's own CDN under Optimizely's certificate. Report URI says this was not CDN cache poisoning and that Optimizely's own sites were affected too.
Three loader forms turned up: a plain script tag pointing at 1688360.cc/track.js, the same URL hidden in base64 and decoded with atob(), and a full inline copy run through eval if the domain was blocked. The payload (track.js) was rebuilt 26 times in one day.
| Time (UTC, 16 Nov) | Event |
|---|---|
| 04:21 | First injection seen, in the BBC snippet |
| 08:10 | First build of track.js, the crypto clipper |
| 13:03 | Attacker sweeps stolen crypto to exchanges |
| 13:43 | Card skimmer added |
| 20:40 to 21:10 | Mass cleanup |
| 21:52 | One of 188 snippets still infected (TalkTalk) |
What the script did to visitors
The clipper replaced Bitcoin, Ethereum, TRON, Solana and other wallet addresses in page text, forms, links and clipboard contents. The skimmer sent card number, expiry and CVV from a site's own forms to card.php on the attacker's domain. Cards typed into hosted payment frames from providers such as Stripe and Adyen were out of its reach. It also took page URLs, cookies without the HttpOnly flag, and html2canvas screenshots.
On iOS, Report URI says the script loaded exploit chains in a hidden iframe depending on version: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18.x, and a third chain for iOS 26 that only fingerprinted the device. Devices on iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, are patched against the relevant flaws. Inc42 reports the same two kit names and adds that no takeover of a physical device has been confirmed; Ostorlab says the same.
The money was small. Report URI counted about $7,040 in attacker wallets at 19:25 UTC on 16 November and roughly $7,100 in its 17 November update. Inc42 gives $7,151 and Ostorlab $7,150, a spread that comes from different update times.
- Banking and finance32 organisations
- Tech and SaaS23 organisations
- Retail and fashion20 organisations
- Streaming and entertainment12 organisations
- News and media10 organisations
Source: Report URI, Optimizely incident write-up, accessed 2026-11-18
Optimizely's notice and the gap in it
Optimizely's status page carries a "Web Experimentation Security Incident" notice timestamped 17 November at 01:02 UTC. It says an unauthorized party "exploited a vulnerability" in Experimentation and used it "to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects", and that the company fixed the flaw and removed the injected code. It names no vulnerability class, no project count and no CVE.
The two accounts do not line up on cause. Report URI wrote that it did not know how the attacker obtained write access to many customer projects and that Optimizely should explain it. Optimizely now says a vulnerability in its own product was the route. Ostorlab adds that no CVE exists and the incident was not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog as of 17 November. The same outlet relays, via StepSecurity, a claim that the flaw sat in the account signup flow. That detail is secondhand and Optimizely has not confirmed it in its notice.
Why a strict CSP mattered
Report URI evaluated the content security policies of 256 affected hosts. Its categories add up to 159: 68 with no policy, 50 that allowed both payload and exfiltration, 17 where connect-src blocked the data theft but the address swapping still ran, and 24 that blocked the payload. Ostorlab reads this as 159 classified organisations, which makes the 24 equal to 15%. Report URI's post does not explain the missing 97.
Allowing cdn.optimizely.com in script-src did not help, because the malicious code came from that trusted host. What protected the 24 was a restrictive script-src. Report URI names 'strict-dynamic' and 'unsafe-eval' as the settings that let the payload through, and says Optimizely's documentation recommends enabling the latter.
What operators should do
Search every Project JavaScript field and experiment for 1688360.cc, atob( and unfamiliar script URLs, then audit who holds write access to the account and rotate credentials. Treat cards entered on a site's own forms on 16 November as exposed, and rotate secrets stored in cookies without HttpOnly. Report URI warns that browser caches may keep the script alive for up to 24 hours after cleanup. The attacker's main domain went on clientHold at 00:37 UTC on 17 November.
The incident follows a pattern the site has tracked before. The CISA November KEV analysis showed how fast exploited-flaw deadlines are shrinking, and the Java4Shell scoring dispute showed how far a vendor's score can sit from a finder's. Here there is no score at all, because there is no CVE. The next thing to watch for is an Optimizely post-incident report that names the flaw and the number of affected projects.
Sources
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