Coway Airmega IconS Downloads Its Root Certificate Over Plain HTTP, a Teardown Finds
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Coway Airmega IconS Downloads Its Root Certificate Over Plain HTTP, a Teardown Finds
The fan ships with no root certificates and trusts whatever CA it is handed during setup. The owner who found it used that to cut Coway's cloud out of the loop.

A Coway Airmega IconS air purifier downloads its root certificate authority certificate over plain HTTP and carries no root certificates of its own, according to a teardown published on Nov. 11, 2026. An attacker positioned on the network path during setup could hand the fan a certificate of their choosing, and the author confirmed the fan trusts a substituted one. The post is a personal blog and cites no CVE.
The author, who writes as scottjg, set out to stop the purifier depending on Coway's IoCare cloud. The post, Reverse engineering my Coway air purifier to ditch the cloud, says the existing Home Assistant integration scrapes and polls that cloud, and that it had broken for five documented reasons.
How the fan trusts its cloud
Commands travel between the app, Coway's cloud and the fan over MQTT on TLS, port 8883. The fan gets its MQTT configuration from an API call that returns an AWS IoT host, the port, and URLs for a certificate and key. The fan downloads its root CA certificate over plain HTTP. In the author's words, it "doesn't have any root certificates built in at all."
The author's hypothesis was that the fan would trust any CA served to it. The post's verdict: "It was always MitM-able." The fan also downloads a device certificate and private key from Coway's servers during setup.

What the weaknesses need
The post lists three weaknesses. The table sets out what each one requires, using only what the post states.
| Weakness | What the post says | Precondition |
|---|---|---|
| Root CA fetched over HTTP | Fan has no built-in roots and trusts a substituted CA | Control of the network path during setup |
| BLE provisioning key | Key is sent over Bluetooth; AES key is that value plus the 12-character MAC, also readable over BLE | Capturing the Bluetooth exchange |
| Setup URLs | caUrl and certSvrUrl accept supplied addresses, so the fan can be pointed at a local server | Ability to provision the device |
The post does not say whether a bystander in Bluetooth range can provision a fan they do not own, and it does not describe any attack on someone else's device. Those preconditions decide how far the risk extends beyond the owner. The post also does not mention telling Coway.
Why the October CA flaw was not needed
The author first looked at the October 2026 eMudhra incident, which the teardown dates to a post by Ian Carroll on Oct. 20. Help Net Security reports that eight eMudhra intermediate certificates carried private keys below 256, and that Scott Helme recovered keys with values of 4, 56 and 115 in under a second.
The post says that attack turned out to be unnecessary, since the plain-HTTP CA download made interception possible without any CA failure. The same trust question shows up in package registries, where provenance signals now grade releases. The post uses tools including mitmproxy, a Raspberry Pi access point, tcpdump, Android Bluetooth HCI logs and jadx, with an AI assistant for the interception setup and protocol decoding, a pattern also seen in agent browsers for coding tools.
The author reimplemented the setup flow in "about 20 minutes", and a custom Home Assistant integration, coway-local, now talks to the fan directly. In the author's words, that "completely cuts the Coway cloud out of the picture during normal operation".
What owners can do
The practical advice is narrow. Provision the fan on a network you control, since the weaknesses depend on someone sitting between the fan and Coway's servers during setup. The Airmega IconS is discontinued, so a firmware fix is unlikely to arrive on its own. The post names the Airmega 250S and MightyS as current Wi-Fi models, but does not test them, so nothing here establishes that they share the flaw.
Sources
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