Alpine's sshd Accepts Any 257-Byte Password for Accounts Locked With a Star
Security / news
Alpine's sshd Accepts Any 257-Byte Password for Accounts Locked With a Star
An overlong password makes musl's crypt() return the same string that marks a passwordless account, and OpenSSH 10.6p2 now works around it. Updating the package does not restart the running daemon.

An attacker who can reach the SSH port of an Alpine Linux host can log in without the password, provided the account's password field is *, another account holds a $5$ or $6$ hash, and the attacker sends a password of 257 to 1,024 bytes. Alpine published the advisory on November 5, 2026, and told users to update openssh and then restart sshd.
The advisory credits Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield with the report. It carries no CVE identifier and no CVSS score. Neither it nor the OpenSSH release notes say the flaw has been used against anyone.
What the attacker needs
The flaw sits in the path sshd takes when it is built without PAM, which is how Alpine's plain openssh-server package ships. In that mode sshd hashes the submitted password with crypt() and compares the result with the stored password field. For an account whose field is too short to hold a salt, sshd borrows the salt of another account.
musl's crypt() returns the single character * when the key is longer than 256 bytes. A passwordless account stores exactly *, so the comparison succeeds. The OpenSSH 10.6p2 release notes call it a password authentication bypass and say the root cause lies outside sshd, which can avoid it. They narrow the exposure to Linux builds without PAM, in practice systems using musl.
The advisory lists five conditions, and all must hold:
- The attacker knows the name of an account whose password field is
*. - The machine has at least one other account with a
$5$or$6$hash. - The attacker sends a password between 257 and 1,024 bytes.
- The host runs
openssh-server, oropenssh-server-pamwithUsePAM no. PasswordAuthenticationisyes.
Not affected, per the advisory: openssh-server-pam with UsePAM yes, hosts with PasswordAuthentication no, locked accounts marked !, and cloud-init images that set PasswordAuthentication no.
Why tiny-cloud images are the worst case
The advisory singles out tiny-cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3. They ship an alpine user whose password is * and which has passwordless doas. A remote login as that user is therefore a path to root, with the username already public.
Affected releases run from Alpine 3.21 through 3.24 and edge. Fixed packages also exist for the unsupported 3.16 to 3.20 branches. Alpine 3.21 reached end of support on November 1, four days before the advisory.
| Branch | Fixed openssh package |
|---|---|
| edge | 10.6_p2-r0 |
| 3.24 | 10.3_p1-r2 |
| 3.23 | 10.2_p1-r1 |
| 3.22 | 10.0_p1-r11 |
| 3.21 | 9.9_p2-r1 |
A limit musl's mailing list argued about in 2024
The 256-byte behaviour is old. On December 29, 2024, Runxi Yu told the musl mailing list that passwd from shadow-utils crashed on Alpine 3.21 with passwords over 256 characters. Yu traced it to crypt_sha512.c, where a failed hash returns "*" from a string literal in read-only memory. Yu wrote that "I think musl's behavior of returning "*" is incorrect", and cited POSIX, under which crypt() should return a null pointer and set errno on error.
Two days later Markus Wichmann replied that the * returns include keys beyond 256 bytes and wrote that "There is no justification for length limits on the password". The thread was about a crash. The advisory shows the same return value also matches the * stored for a passwordless account.
What to do before the next login attempt
Run apk upgrade -U -a, then rc-service sshd restart. The advisory says plainly that upgrading the package alone does not replace the running daemon, so a patched host that has not restarted sshd is still exposed.
If you cannot update, set PasswordAuthentication no, confirm key login works first and keep a session open. To check for past misuse, search /var/log/messages for Accepted password for on accounts such as alpine or root, and review doas use, new users and authorized_keys. The advisory says a machine where a login cannot be ruled out should be treated as compromised.
Cloud instances need the update or the setting change on every running copy. Debian and Ubuntu shipped an apt fix for a root code execution flaw on November 4, and Zyxel's advisory for a GS1900 switch bug that survived its June patch followed on November 3. The next fixed point to watch is Alpine's 3.24.4 point release, which the advisory names alongside 3.21.10, 3.22.8 and 3.23.8.
Sources
More in Security
- 01Ruby2Shell (CVE-2026-132825): Ruby Is Fixed, but GitLab, GitHub Enterprise and Chatwoot Are Listed Without a PatchA one-byte heap overflow in Ruby's case conversion carries a 7.4 local score, while the researchers say stock Rails is remotely reachable and will publish a proof of concept Nov. 25.
- 02NPCI Wants Overlay Permissions Restricted on Sideloaded Apps; Google's 2024 India Block List Omits ThemThe reported ask covers accessibility, device admin and display-over-apps. The pilot Google announced on Oct. 3, 2024 named four other permissions.
- 03CVE-2026-99312: A KVM Nested-AMD Bug Scores 8.8, With Fixes Listed for Three Kernel BranchesThe Linux CNA's scoring notes describe a freed page-table root that a guest can aim at; the commit message describes only a stale MMU context.
- 04CISA's Nov. 18 KEV Additions Include Apache Axis 1.x, Which Has No Fix, With a Nov. 21 DeadlineThree of four new entries carry a three-day federal deadline; LiteLLM's advisory names two different patched versions.